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This dissertation looks at the labour unrest that has fast become an increasing reality with 
perpetual scales of violence that is directed at property and person during strikes being witnessed 
with uncomfortable regularity. The violence of the Lomin strike that took place in 2012 on the 
Hills of Marikana is not unique. Through section 65 of the Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 
of 2014 the legislative arm of government has taken steps to address these concerns. This sections 
aims to limit the scope of when one may resort to a strike with the aim of resolving a labour 
dispute. The purpose behind the amendments to the “Act is to respond to unacceptable levels of 
unprotected industrial action and unlawful acts in support of industrial action, including violence 
and intimidation.”  
While it is easy at the outset to nod aggressively in the affirmative and hold that this is a perfect 
way to make certain that labour unrest and violence is a distant memory, anyone who is abreast 
with the history of South African labour disputes will understand that limiting the right to strike 
rarely off sets violence and protracted strikes. This discussion goes further by investigating 
whether there are other possible solutions to the conundrum that is labour unrest, other than those 
detailed in the Amendment Act.  There dissertation also investigates underlying social orders in 
the form of divisions among trade unions and structural inequalities which are said to be key 
factors behind violent strikes.  
Of significance to the discussion is a look at whether there is any merit in moving away from 
pluralistic and adversarial relations into strong social democratic corporatism that is built on trust 
and compromise. At the last, the effectiveness of institutionalising industrial conflict is also 







vii | P a g e  
 
LIST OF ACCRONYMS 
 
AMCU  Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union 
ANC   African National Congress 
CCMA  Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
COSATU  Congress of the South African Trade Union 
DA   Democratic Alliance 
NEDLAC  National Economic Development and Labour Council 
NUM   National Union of Metal Workers 
RDOs   Rock Drill Operators 
SACTU  South African Congress of Trade Unions 














viii | P a g e  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DECLARATION          ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS         iii 
DEDICATION          iv 
ABSTRACT           v 
LIST OF ACCRONYMS         vi 
CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND 
1.1 INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY    1 
1.2 THE PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH       3 
1.3 THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM      3 
1.4 ASSUMPTION UNDERLYING THE STUDY      4 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY        4 
1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS        5 
1.7 SEQUENCE OF CHAPTERS        5 
CHAPTER TWO: CIRCUMVENTING ANOTHER MARIKANA MASSACRE: 
LIMITING THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN A BREAKING SOCIETY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION         6 
2.2 THE LONMIN MARIKANA STRIKE       9 
2.3 THE RIGHT TO STRIKE        11 
2.4 LIMITING ON THE RIGHT TO STRIKE      13 
2.4.1 Added issues of dispute         14 
2.5 CONCLUSION          15 
CHAPTER THREE: INSTITUTIONALISATION OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION         17 
3.2 INSTITUTIONALISED INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT     19 
3.2.1 Definition          20 
3.2.2 Common law          20 
3.2.3 Apartheid regime         22 
3.2.4 Post-apartheid          25 
3.3 CONCLUSION          27 
ix | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER FOUR: REFORMING LABOUR RELATIONS LAW ACCORDING TO 
THE IDEALS OF SOCIAL CORPORATISM 
4.1 INTRODUCTION         29 
4.2 PLURALISM AS AN APPROACH TO INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT   32 
4.3 THE CURRENT LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK     33 
4.3.1 Remnants of social corporatism       34 
4.3.2 The Marikana massacre: A case in point       35 
4.4 TOWARDS SOCIAL CORPORATISM       37 
4.5 CONCLUSION          39 
CHAPTER FIVE: RECOMMONDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 RECOMMENDATION         40 
5.1.2 Building a strong tripartite relationship      40 
5.1.3 Pre-emptive collective bargaining        41 
5.1.4 A new look: Amendment Act        42 

















1.1 INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY  
Labour unrest has fast become a regular feature in the South Africa news.1 The violence of the 
Lomin strike that took place in 2012 on the Hills of Marikana is not unique.2 A perpetual increase 
in cases involving violence that is directed at property and person during strikes is now a norm 
in South Africa.3  Dispute resolution specialist John Brand contends that South Africa has the 
highest rates of industrial actions which are among the most violent in the world.4 Through 
section 65 of the Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 of 20145 the legislative arm of government 
has taken steps to address these concerns. This sections aims to limit the scope of when one may 
resort to a strike or lock-out with the aim of resolving a labour dispute.6  Here the legislature has 
further restricted the rights to strike by adding that such a right does not exist when the dispute 
can be resolved through arbitration, or the Labour Court or in terms of any other employment 
law.7 
 It remains to be seen as to whether these amendments will have the desired effect. The purpose 
‘is to respond to the unacceptable levels of unprotected industrial action and unlawful acts in 
support of industrial action, including violence and intimidation’.8 Whiles it is easy at the outset 
to nod aggressively in the affirmative and hold that this is a perfect way to make certain that 
labour unrest and violence is a distant memory, anyone who is abreast with the history of South 
African labour disputes will understand that limiting the right to strike rarely off sets violent and 
protracted strikes.9 This discussion goes further by investigating whether there are other possible 
solutions to the conundrum that is labour unrest other than the limitation of the right to strike. 
                                                          
1 M Schutte & S Lukhele ‘The real toll of South Africa’s labour aggressiveness: Regular and prolonged violent 
strikes characterise endless labour strife’ (2013) Africa Conflict Monthly Monitor 69.   
2 A Rycroft ‘Strikes and amendments to the LRA’ (2015) 36 ILJ 1.  
3 Ibid.  
4 N Odendaal ‘SA One of the world’s most violent, strike-prone countries’ Engineering News 6 August 2014, 
available at http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/sa-one-of-the-worlds-most-violent-strike-prone-
countries-2014-08-06, accessed on 18 April 2015.  
5 Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 of 2014, hereafter referred to as ‘the Amendment Act’. 
6 Ibid, s 65. 
7 Ibid, s 65 (1) (c).  
8 Memorandum of Objects on Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2012 B16-2012 GG 35212 of 5 April 2012. 
9 Rycroft (note 2 above) 3. 
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One such shared opinion which is canvassed and supported by this contribution notes that the 
introduction of stricter controls on strikes so as to circumvent violence is an approach that is 
misguided.10 The contribution holds that resurgent violence on the picket-line is a wakeup call 
to reconsider our system of dispute resolution, including strike law with the aim of doing away 
with the aim of doing away with stricter controls on strike law.11 Another solution which has 
been suggested is that we should be focused on addressing structural violence within societies, 
as this is the primary reasons for violent strikes and labour unrest.12 The discussion will look at 
whether this proposed solution has merit given the fact that structural violence is a culmination 
of decades of structural discrimination and as such it can only be addressed progressively and 
that there are already measures in place to address the same.13 At this point it suffices to say that 
most authors agree that until the underlying social orders are addressed, striking workers will 
continue to disregard the dispute resolution procedures of the Act.14 However the need for a 
solution is immediate; limiting the right to strike could concievably bring an immediate end to 
violence strikes.15  
This dissertation largely focuses on amendments to the right to strike and their impact on dispute 
resolution and labour unrest; this however cannot be done without situating them in the context 
of the Marikana massacre. The tragedy that unfolded in the platinum hills of Lonmin in 2012 
provides a vantage point from which the usefulness of the amendments can be measured.16 At 
the final stage the discussion will look at whether it possible to reconstruct our labour relations 
framework, acknowledging that the current one is ineffective in dealing with labour unrest as it 
is currently built on pluralistic and adversarial relationships. The discussion will conclude by 
investigating whether we ought to fully adopt social corporatism, with the building of trust and 
compromise between the tripartite relationships being the main target by which we are to defeat 
violent labour unrest.  
 
                                                          
10 D du Toit & R Ronnie ‘The necessary evolution of strike law’ (2012) Acta Juridica 195. 
11 Ibid. 
12 T Ngcukaitobi ‘Strike law, structural violence and inequalities in the platinum hills of Marikana’ (2013) 34 ILJ 
836.  
13 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, hereafter referred to as ‘the Constitution’, Section 9 
(2); Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998; Broad-Based Economic Empower Act 53 of 2003.  
14 Rycroft (note 2 above) 3. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ngcukaitobi (note 12 above) 858. 
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1.2 THE PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research undertaking is to consider whether the amendments to the Act in 
regards to the right to strike will have the effect that the legislature intended; that is to circumvent 
another Marikana massacre and to determine whether an opportunity has been lost to refashion 
strike law so that it evolves in a way which takes cognisance of contemporary realities such as 
social inequalities and division among trade unions.17 
The thinking behind this undertaking is aimed at providing a framework for how to best solve 
South Africa’s high levels of labour unrest. This is to be achieved by way of critically analysing 
the amendments to the Act and then looking at whether there are alternatives that can be put in 
place to achieve the same purpose. The importance of undertaking this study is significant as it 
forms a building block in discussions which includes invaluable contributions from dispute 
resolution specialist Brand and Professor A. Rycroft.18 At its simplest, the task is aimed at 
providing a framework in terms of which we can tackle one of the greatest failing of our liberal 
democracy, this being increased industrial action that is characterised by perpetual scales of 
violence. Constant fighting between different trade unions19 impacts significantly on the social 
and economic development of the country.20 This work will be imperative in finding a solution 
to these hostilities. In adding to the pool of research on how to best solve the conundrum of 
increasing level of violent strikes, this study can be useful to those writing labour policies.  
1.3 THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The purpose of the Act is to advance economic development, social justice and labour peace of 
which are to be achieved through the promotion of ‘orderly collective bargaining’ and ‘effective 
resolution of labour disputes’.21 The provisions of the Code of Good Practice22 envisage a 
situation where violence in strikes is such a serious offence that it could necessitate dismissal.23 
                                                          
17 K Good Trust in the Capacities of the People, Distrust in Elites (2014) 217. 
18 A Rycroft ‘What can be done about strike-related violence?’ (2014) 30(2) International Journal of Comparative 
Law and Industrial Resolutions; J Brand ‘Developing an effective strike avoidance strategy’ 23rd Annual Labour 
Conference August 2010. 
19 K Good Trust in the Capacities of the People, Distrust in Elites (2014) 217 
20 In 2014 the number of working days lost stood at 10.2 million while in 2013 only 1.8 million working days were 
lost due to labour unrest and in 2014 the monetary impact of strikes reported amounted to R6 170 768 282 
compared to only R1 073 109 003 in 2011, South African Department of Labour Annual Industrial Action Report 
(2014) 4; J Du Toit ‘Strikes in Numbers - 2013’ The South African Labour Guide 2014, available at http://www.labour 
guide.co.za/most-recent/1944-strikes-in-numbers-2013, accessed on 10 June 2015. 
21 Section 1 (d) of the Act.  
22 Good Practice: Dismissal and Industrial Action of the Act: Schedule 8.  
23 Ibid, Iitem 6 (1). 
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Notwithstanding this, violence continues to characterise a number of strikes including the 
Marikana massacre, this has led to uncertainty of the effectiveness of the Act in this vital area.24 
The contention advanced in this submission is that the violence that is widely apparent is more 
like a symptom of the problem at hand, the situation is a lot more precarious. The violence that 
is being witnessed during strikes is not entirely the result of disappointment in low wages or poor 
working conditions but rather it is a dramatic expression of the frustration in widespread social 
inequality, racial division, pluralistic labour relations and a failing justice system that promises 
the improvement of the quality of life for all citizens but which fails to deliver.25   
1.4  ASSUMPTION UNDERLYING THE STUDY 
The study acknowledges the role of the government in the progressive realisation of economic 
justice for those who are marginalised and downtrodden. It further notes that the structural 
inequalities in the labour sector are being attended to. The Farlam Commission of Inquiry was 
largely aimed at investigating the mishaps that led to the Marikana masscre.26 The Farlam 
Commission is meant to provide a vantage point for discussions about how to better avoid the 
tragedy that was. However through the Amendment Act, this discussion contends that the 
government jumped the gun. They sought to deal with the symptom of the problem either because 
they did not realise the cause or they choose to ignore it, the latter being more conceivable. The 
assumption is that the government through the Amendment Act is at best trying to deal with the 
fallout and international outcry in a manner that satisfies their immediate political needs and not 
the broader needs of society. 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
A qualitative research methodology will be employed for this study. Reference will be made to 
primary sources in the form of legislation and case law relevant to the topic. Secondary sources 
such as journals, text books and internet sources will be also be consulted.  
 
 
                                                          
24 Du Toit & Ronnie (note 10 above) 195-196.  
25 Ibid.  
26 GN 50 of GG 35680, 12/09/12; 1; I G Farlam Marikana Commission of Inquiry: Report On Matters of Public, 
National and International Concern Arising out of the Tragic Incidents at the Lonmin Marikana, in the North West 
Province (2015) 1, hereafter referred to as the ‘Farlam Commission’.  
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1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
“Not knowing a question is to forfeit the answer. The following questions will be considered in 
this dissertation: 
1) [To] what” extent does the Amendment Act limit the right to strike?  
2) What was the intention behind the promulgation of these amendments? 
3) Will the amendments have the desired effect? 
4) Are there other ways in which to solve labour unrest? 
5) The Marikana massacre, does it have anything to do with the amendments? 
6) Is there a place for social corporatism in South Africa? 
1.7 THE SEQUENCE OF CHAPTERS 
This dissertation comprises of five chapters. Chapter one outlines the background to the study 
and the purpose behind the research undertaking. Chapter two essentially looks at the current 
legislative frame work and the likely effects the 2014 amendments to strike law will have on 
effective dispute resolution. The chapter concludes by using the Marikana massacre to 
contextualise the problems relating to strike violence. Following this is chapter three which looks 
at the current strategy of the institutionalisation of industrial conflict as an effective approach to 
labour unrest. Chapter four will then investigate the possibility of moving from pluralism towards 
social corporatism as a necessary reform of our labour relations system. The study then ends with 
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CHAPTER TWO 
CIRCUMVENTING ANOTHER MARIKANA MASSACRE: LIMITING 
THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN A BREAKING SOCIETY 
 ‘Violence on the picket-line is a wake-up call not simply to introduce striker controls, but to re-examine 
our system of dispute resolution, including strike law, more generally with a view to eliminating 
dysfunctional barriers rather than introducing new ones’27  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
In South Africa, labour unrest is fast becoming an increasing reality with28 perpetual scales of 
violence that is directed at property and person during strikes being witnessed with 
uncomfortable regularity.29 In a bid to curb this surge of protracted and violent strikes, the 
Minister of Labour tabled in Parliament, the Labour Relations Amendment Bill 201230 for 
approval. It’s introduction was intended as an immediate response to the increasing levels of 
‘unprotected industrial action and unlawful acts such as violence and intimidation’.31 
Notwithstanding this position, a number of violent strikes followed in the same year, including 
the massacre of 34 miners in the Lonmin Marikana strike32 and the Farm Workers strike33 that 
left three people dead in the Western Cape.34 The 2012 Amendment Bill became part of our 
labour system when it was signed into law by the President, Jacob Zuma in the penultimate days 
of December 2014 and it came into operation on 1 January 2015.35 Included in the amendments 
are additional limitations on the right to strike which are meant to be a response to the increasing 
levels of violence strikes.36  
                                                          
27 Du Toit & Ronnie (note 10 above) 195.  
28 Schutte & Sandile (note 1 above) 69. 
29 Rycroft (note 2 above) 1. 
30 Memorandum of Objects on Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2012 B16-2012 GG 35212 of 5 April 2012 
http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/downloads/legislation/bills/proposed-amendmentsbills/memoofobjectsslra.pdf, 
hereafter referred to as the ‘2012 Amendment Bill’. 
31 Ibid, 4. 
32 K Selala ‘The right to strike and the future of collective bargaining in South Africa: An exploratory analysis’ (2014) 
3(5) International Journal of Social Sciences 121. 
33 M Bagraim ‘Counting the cost of the Cape farm strikes’ Business Day Live 16 November 2012,  available at, 
http://www.bdlive/business/agriculture/2012/11/16/counting-the-cost-of-cape-farm-strikes, accessed 6 July 
2015. 
34 Ibid.  
35 GN 38317 of GG 10336, 19/12/2014.  
36 Memorandum of Objects on the Labour Relations Amendment Bill (note 8 above) 4. 
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The discussion that follows concerns these very limitations that have now become part of the 
Act. Of particular interest are the amendments to s 65(1)(c) which seek to further limit the right 
to strike by excluding it in circumstances where the issue in dispute is one that could be referred 
to arbitration or to the Labour Court in terms any other employment law.37 Prior to these changes 
s 65(1)(c) did not warrant exclusion of the right to strike in instances where the dispute concerned 
issues that could be referred to arbitration or to the Labour Court in terms of employment law. 
The effect of this is far reaching, for one, striking over claims of unfair discrimination is now 
proscribed because such matters can be referred to the Labour Court in terms of the Employment 
Equity Act38 which falls under the ambit of employment law.39 From this it is obvious that one 
of the solutions proposed by government in addressing the increasing levels of unprotected and 
violent strikes is by further proscribing the circumstances under which employees can strike. In 
the wake of continued violence on the picket-line, several commentators have started questioning 
this stance of the government.40  
One submission considers such an approach as one that is faulty in judgement.41 The argument 
holds that we ought to engage with our system of dispute resolutions with a view of attending to 
the underlying social disorders that continue to manifest in the form of violence strikes.42 
Another contention considers the amendments as being inadequate if regard is had to the impact 
of industrial action on the socio-economic interests of the parties involved.43 It concludes by 
holding that the burning problem that is violent strikes draws its fuel from dysfunctional 
industrial relationships and that s 65 does not attempt to address the broader issues affecting this 
relationship.44 At the heart of these propositions are pleas directed at the government to look at 
the underlying social disorders in an effort of rebuilding our broken industrial relations from the 
ground up. These concerns further implore researchers to direct attention to structural 
                                                          
37 The Act, section 65 (1)(c).  
38 No 55 of 1998, hereafter referred to as the ‘Equity Act’. 
39 A Patel and K Letlonkane ‘Limiting the right to strike’ The South African Labour Guide, available at 
http://www.labourguide.co.za/most-recent/16116-limiting-the-right-to-strike-section-65-of-the-labour-relations-
act, accessed 13 August 2015.  
40 Selala (note 32 above) 124; K Von Holdt ‘Institutionalisation, strike violence and local moral orders’ (2010) 72/73 
Transformation: Critical Perspectives on South Africa 127. 
41 Du Toit & Ronnie (note 10 above) 195. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Selala (note 32 above) 124. 
44 Ibid. 
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inequalities with the aim of investigating the existence of a nexus between it and workers 
disregard of dispute resolution procedures.45   
The discussion clearly shows that entrenched social inequalities from the apartheid era are still 
present in our constitutional order.46 The absence of meaningful social transformation to remedy 
structural inequalities has according to Professor Rycroft, left it to the police47 and labour 
relations to deal with its unforgiving and violent consequences.48 If indeed the violence in recent 
strikes is really just a dramatic expression of frustration with structural inequalities then there is 
merit in suggesting that the s 65 amendments will prove inadequate in dealing with the situation 
that is.49 The police, and to some extent labour unions and managers of companies, will be left 
with the unenviable task of trying to restore order on the picket-line. Adding to this, non-striking 
workers will continue to be subject of intimidation and assault in a war that is political as opposed 
to being about matters of employment.  
This chapter will concentrate on the amendments to strike law and the likely implications they 
will have on dispute resolution in particular on dispute matters that the Act proscribes. In this 
regard the focus will be on the added issues in which workers can no longer go to strike over as 
a result of the Amendment Act. Subsequent to this is a look at whether limiting the right to strike 
will have the effect of containing the increasing levels of unprotected and violent strikes. The 
point of departure in this chapter will be the events of the Marikana strike. It has been argued 
that the Marikana strike provides a unique vantage point from which the utility of the proposed 
amendments can be consider.50 The killing of 34 workers by the police on 16 August 2012 almost 
two decades into democracy poses series questions on the country’s socio economic and political 
order and the integrity of our industrial relations system.  
 
 
                                                          
45 M Samuel ‘The mineworkers’ unprocedural strike: Setting the path for redefining collective bargaining practice 
in South Africa’ (2013) 10 Journal of Contemporary Management 239. 
46 B Dixon ‘Waiting for Farlam: Marikana, social inequality and the relative autonomy of the police’ (2014) 46 SA 
Crime Quarterly 7; A Padachee & A Desai ‘Post-apartheid South Africa and the crisis of expectation – DPRN FOUR’ 
(2011) Rozenberg Quarterly, available at http://rozenburgquartely.com/?=4597, accessed 2 November 2015. 
47 Rycroft ‘(note 18 above) 215. 
48 Ibid 1. 
49 Ngcukaitobi (note 12 above) 836;  
50 Ibid. 
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2.2 THE LONMIN MARIKANA STRIKE 
The tragic events of the Marikana strike were occasioned against the backdrop of unemployment, 
shortcomings in public service delivery and structural violence.51 Against this prologue the 
narrative unfolds with a three thousand strong protest by rock drill operators (RDOs) of the 
Lonmin Platinum mine on 9 August 2012.52 Improved working conditions and salary increases 
from R4500 to R12500 formed the initial point of contention.53 The first trace of potency 
occasioned on the morning after the strike began, when Lonmin security opened fire with rubber 
bullets, allegedly firing more than 40 rounds at strikers who had amassed at the mine shafts 
where some workers were toiling.54 In the aftermath, two of the protesters were seriously injured 
and hospitalised. It came to light that the National Union of Mine Workers Union (NUM) had 
assisted workers in attending to their shifts, this only agitated the growing number of protesters 
who showed their disconcert by marching with an array of menacing weapons to the offices of 
NUM with unforgiving intention.55 Engagement on a violent level between the advancing 
crowed and NUM officials soon broke out, resulting in the serious injuries of two workers who 
were shot and bludgeoned by the officials.56 At this juncture the atmosphere had become tenuous, 
relationships on all fronts had broken down. Division among trade unions added to an already 
volatile situation which lead to the bloodshed and violence that was to be witnessed in the 
following days.57  
In the three days that followed, violence on a perpetual scale became the order of the events that 
were to occur. In the days between the 12th and the 14th of August, a tally of 10 people would be 
killed in incidents related to the conflict.58 The business of 12 August commenced with a stand-
off between Lonmin security and an assembly of 1000 strikers.59 Security officers responded 
with rubber bullets to a rock that had been hurled at them leading to an attack by the strikers, 
                                                          
51 C Twala ‘The Marikana massacre: A historical overview of the labour unrest in the mining sector in South Africa’ 
(2012) 1(2) South African Peace and Security Studies 66.   
52 D Bruce ‘Marikana: A summary and analysis of the Farlam report – CASAC’ Politic Web 18 August 2015, available 
at http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/marikana-a-summary -analysis-of-the-farlam-report, accessed 5 
November 2015.   
53 Selala (note 32 above) 121. 
54 N Davies ‘Marikana massacre: the untold story of the strike leader who died for workers’ rights’ The Guardian 
19 May 2015, available at http:www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/19/marikana-massacre-the-untold-story-
strike-leader-who-died-for-workers-rights, accessed 5 November 2015.  
55 Farlam (note 26 above) 96.  
56 Ibid 95.  
57 Good (note 17 above) 217. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Bruce (see note 52 above).  
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who slashed one guard from armpit to hip and hacked two others death.60 By dawn, two miners 
had been killed, one in an ambush attack while on his way to work.61 Bloodshed then spilled 
over into the next day which saw the killings of two police officers and three strikers in a 
confrontation between the police and the striking workers.62 In a turn of events, the two days that 
followed were relatively peaceful, there were negotiations between Lonmin management, 
strikers and representatives from the South African Police Service (SAPS) on how to bring about 
a voluntary surrender of weapons. Plans to disperse strikers from the koppie were also 
discussed.63 This however proved to be just a lull before the storm of 16 August.  
The 16th of August began like any normal South African day but its end was anything but normal, 
it was unnerving.64 The lives of 34 people were lost and by all accounts they had been shot by 
members of the SAPS.65 In an attempt to continue with negotiations from the previous day, 
Joseph Mathunjwa, president of the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union 
(AMCU), made attempts to meet with Lonmin executives to iron out details of a plan that would 
see the strikers return to work.66 Alas, this proved futile as Lonmin management now refused to 
discuss anything.67 The Farlam Commission report makes only a brief reference to this stance 
by Lonmin management, by going only as far as criticise it.68 At this time the presence of the 
police had increased considerably, this was a move to carry out the endorsement of an 
extraordinary session by the SAPS which resolved that the strikers would be forcibly removed 
from the koppie if they did not lay down their arms.69 In a final bid to end violence and return 
strikers to their primary purpose of wage negotiations, Muthunjwa spoke with passion to the 
hundreds of strikers that had gathered at koppie, pleading with them to put an end to the 
bloodshed.70 The strikers heeded his call and as he led the crowd away, a hail of bullets were 
fired from all directions by the police. At the end of it all, 34 of the 112 miners shot were dead, 
this was to be one of the deadliest attacks in the post-apartheid regime. It became clear that there 
was more to this than initially met the eye, this was not just another strike about salary increases. 
                                                          
60 Davies (note 54 above). 
61 ‘Marikana timeline of events’ News 24, available at http://news24.com/multimedia/timelines/marikana-
timeline-of-events-20130815, accessed 21 November 2015; Farlam (note 27 above) 118-122. 
62 Farlam (note 26 above) 128.  
63 Ibid 151-176.   
64 Ngcukaitobi (note 12 above) 35. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Farlam (note 26 above) 177.  
67 Ibid.  
68 Davies (note 54 above).  
69 Farlam (note 26 above) 556. 
70 Davies (note 54 above).  
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It was apparent from the violence on both sides that it turned on larger issues, many of them 
political in nature. 
This narrative is important as it helps us consider with clarity all the matters at hand, among 
these the right to strike, limitation of the right, underlying social orders and broken relations. 
Much of the discussion that follows considers these matters in an attempt to use the massacre as 
a foundation in which to find a solution to the problem that is violent labour unrest. From this 
narrative, a few important things become clear. We learn that underlying social orders include a 
lack of trust between unions and its members, there is total disregard of dispute resolution 
procedures of the Act and finally that the government is taking an increasing intolerance to 
unprotected strikes.   
2.3 THE RIGHT TO STRIKE  
Since the turn of our constitutional order, the right to strike has enjoyed a high degree of 
protection.71 This was affirmed by the Constitutional Court in the case of National Union of 
Metal Workers of South Africa v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd,72 where it held that the dignity of workers 
depends on it.73 In light of this it will be hard to forget the words of O’Regan J where she said 
that, ‘protection of human dignity is the touchstone of the new political order and is fundamental 
to the new Constitution’.74 On the one hand, worker’s organisations regard the right to strike as 
ultimate and as one of their inalienable prerogatives.75 On the other hand employers see the right 
as a threat to the economic prospects of their business. On the backdrop of these conflicting 
attitudes to the right to strike, it is necessary to outline what the right entails, investigating its 
purpose, denotation and position in the context of violent protests. The discussion that follows is 
aimed at discerning the link between unprecedented levels of violence on the picket-line, the 
right to strike and the limitation thereof.  
Section 23(2) (c) of the 1996 Constitution76 guarantees that every worker has the right to strike. 
In reaffirming this the Act was enacted specifically to give effect to the labour rights of s 23 of 
                                                          
71 National Union of Public Services & Allied Workers obo Mani v National Lotteries Board (2014) 32 ILJ 1885 (CC) 
para 33.  
72 (2003) 24 ILJ 305 (CC).  
73 Ibid, para 13.  
74 S v Makwanyane (1995 (3) SA 391, para 329.  
75 E Khan ‘The right to strike in South Africa: An historical analysis’ (1943) 11(1) The South African Journal of 
Economics 24.  
76 The Constitution. 
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the Constitution.77 In doing so it provides procedures for the exercise of the right, and the 
protection of strikes. The Act provides in s 64(1) that ‘every employee has the right to strike and 
every employer has the recourse to a lock-out’.78 A strike is then defined in s 213 of the Act as; 
‘The partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or obstruction of work, by 
persons who are or have been employed by the same employer or by different employers, for the 
purposed of remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute in respect of any matter of mutual 
interest between employer and employee, and every reference to work in this definition includes 
overtime work, whether it is voluntary or compulsory.’79  
It therefore becomes clear that only employee actions listed above may be termed a ‘strike’.80 A 
considerable link between collective action and the right to strike exists. It is acknowledged that 
without the right to strike, unions will lack the foundation for voluntary negotiations and 
agreement.81 This means that collective bargaining in the absence of the right to strike becomes 
collective begging.82 Lastly, at the heart of any industrial action must be the aim of remedying a 
grievance that relate to matters of mutual interests. It follows that to meet this requirement of a 
strike; the stoppage must have a work related aim.83 This requirement has been the subject of 
much debate with authors calling the recent strikes political in nature, these being couched under 
the guise of labour related issues.84 Even if this proposition is accepted, there is still no 
explanation as to why violence continues to characterise recent strikes. 
When one looks at the definition of a strike which contemplates some form of stoppage in work, 
it becomes clear that strikes by their nature, are intended to cause the employer economic harm.85 
By withholding their labour, the employees hope to bring production to a halt, causing the 
employer to lose business and to sustain overhead expenses without the prospect of income, in 
the expectation, that should the losses be sufficiently substantial, the employer will accede to 
their demands.86 In the case of Food & Allied Workers Union on behalf of Kapesi v Premier 
                                                          
77 Ibid, section 23.  
78 The Act, section 64(1). 
79 Ibid, Section 213. 
80 M Finnemore Introduction to Labour Relations in South Africa 8th ed (2002) 220.  
81 Ibid 223.  
82 Rycroft (note 2 above) 222. 
83 D Woolfrey ‘Strike and lock-outs’ in D du Toit (ed) Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide 3rd ed (2000) 
231. 
84 A Myburgh ‘The failure to obey interdicts prohibiting strikes and violence: The implications for labour law and 
the rule of law’ (2013 23(1) Contemporary Labour Law 5.  
85 Stuttafords v SACTWU [2001] 1 BLLR 47 (LAC). 
86 H Cheadle ‘Strikes’ in M Brassey (ed) The New Labour Law (1987) 244.  
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Food Ltd t/a Blue Ribbon Salt River,87 Basson J correctly finds that the aim of a strike is to 
persuade the employer to agree to their demands through the peaceful withholding of work.88 
Some degree of disruption to the employer’s business operations is expected, however it is not 
accepted that violence and criminal conduct would be employed to force the employer to accede 
to the demands, as seen in recent times.89 The purpose behind a strike does not contemplate that 
there be violence that is directed on non-striking workers and that there be damage to property  
While some form of passionate engagement is expected in strikes there is no room for violence. 
Despite this a number of strikes have turned into a war zone between employees, employers and 
the police. In an attempt to deal with this fall out, the right to strike has been limited in various 
forms, some of which are considered below. However, it is believed that limiting the right to 
strike by making it unlawful to go on strike over certain added issues of dispute will not bring 
about peace on the picket-line, as anyone who is abreast with South African’s labour history will 
understand that limiting the right to strike rarely offset violent strikes.90 
2.4 LIMITING THE RIGHT TO STRIKE 
Underpinning the right to strike is a philosophical argument which holds that in the absence of 
power to affect the course of events, a group lacks the responsibility to reach a decision.91 Power 
is the source of responsibility. A strike is therefore seen as the most effective weapon for trade 
unions without which they lack the foundation for voluntary negotiation and agreement.92 As 
outlined earlier, worker’s organisations regard the right to strike as ultimate and as one of their 
inalienable prerogatives.93 Contrary to this belief, the right to strike is never absolute or 
unconditional since it does not operate in a vacuum.94 The interests of the larger society dictate 
that there is some form of control on the right to strike.95  
The Amendments Act aims to give effect to this by limiting the right to strike even further, to 
achieve this the right is excluded in circumstances where the issue in dispute is one that could be 
                                                          
87 (2010) 31 ILJ 1654 (LC).  
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referred to arbitration or to the Labour Court in terms of employment law.96 Before the 
amendments were signed into law, workers could not go on strike over issues that could be 
referred to arbitration or the labour court in terms of employment law. The new amendments will 
limit the scope of issues in which employees can go on strike for. The passage that follows looks 
at the effect of these amendments but before then it is necessary to outline circumstances in 
which employees are generally prohibited from striking.  
“Section 65(1) of the [Act] provides that no person may take part in a strike or a lockout or in 
any conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike or a lock-out if bound by a collective 
agreement that prohibits a strike or lock-out in respect of the issue in dispute.97 Similarly” where 
employees are “bound by an agreement that requires the issue in dispute to be referred to 
arbitration; or the issue in dispute is one that a party has the right to refer to arbitration or to the 
Labour Court in terms of [the] Act” they may not strike.98 Lastly employees who are engaged in 
essential or maintenance services are also prohibited from exercising the right to strike.99 
2.4.1 Added issues of disputes.  
As outlined earlier, the Amendments Act limits the right to strike further by excluding it in 
circumstances where the issue in dispute is one that could be referred to arbitration or to the 
Labour Court in terms of employment law.100 Employment law can be explained as a system of 
rules and standards that regulate the workplace relations.101 If a dispute falls under employment 
law and such disputes could have been referred to arbitration or to the Labour Court and the 
ensuing strike action is on that issue, it will be unprotected because the prescribed dispute 
resolution procedures in terms of the Act would have not been followed.  
The amendments therefore have far reaching consequences as employment law covers a number 
of issues that before the amendments, employees could go on strike for. Some of the issues that 
can be referred for adjudication or arbitration in terms of employment law102 are issues that fall 
under the;103 Unemployment Insurance Act;104 Skills Development Act;105 Employment Equity 
                                                          
96 The Act, section 65(2)(c).  
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Act;106 Occupational Health and Safety Act;107 Compensation for Occupational Injuries and 
Diseases Act;108 Unemployment Insurance Act109 as well as issues regulated by the Basic 
Condition of Employment Act.110 
The issue that is most contentious and is bound to be the subject of contested debate relates to 
claims of unfair discrimination. As a result of the amendments, employees are now prohibited 
from going strike over claims of issues of unfair discrimination because such issues can be 
referred to the Labour Court in terms of the Equity Act.111 Trade unions have since expressed 
disconcert at these amendments.112 The right to strike is seen as an important tool for trade unions 
who believe that the withholding thereof is an attack on unions and workers’ constitutional right 
to strike.113 Trade unions believe that limiting the right to strike is an infringement of its right to 
bargain collectively and the right of its members to strike.114 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
The right to strike is an important one as it is aligned to the dignity of workers. Without the tool 
that is the ability to go on strike, unions are left with a compromised position of collective 
‘begging’ rather than collective bargaining. In light of this it becomes imperative to explore 
alternative solutions to violent protests, to find answers that work but do not unnecessarily 
restrict constitutionally guaranteed rights.  
The narrative above is detailed, this summation rounds up the discussion by highlighting some 
of the important points and attempts to provide responses to the many questions raised. One such 
question is whether introducing stricter controls of strike law is the proper response to the recent 
spate of violence in strikes. The contention advanced in this discussion is that these amendments 
are misguided. Limiting the right to strike cannot in any form curb violence on the picket line. 
Anyone who is abreast with recent labour unrest is privy to the fact that most of these strikes are 
unprotected. The trend is that workers go on strike regardless of whether there is a prohibition 
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against doing so.115 There is a tendency for those engaged in industrial action to disregard the 
requirements of labour legislation by embarking on wildcat strike action and in the process 
employing violence and intimidation in order to force the employer to accede to their demands.116 
The employer accedes to the demands of the strikers as a way of responding to the violence and 
not necessarily the issues in dispute.  
The combination of anti-strike provisions such as declaring collective organisations to be 
unconscionable restraints of trade and blandishment is not at all that effective.117 A spate of 
violence continued well into the seventies which saw a considerable increase in the number of 
strikes.118 The strikes were largely illegal but they happened all the same.119 Either the workers 
did not know about the prohibition or they did not care.120 How then can it be that four decades 
later the only means of responding to violent strike remains unchanged? How can it be that the 
government believes that limiting the right to strike is going to work now when it has never 
worked before?121 It is the opinion of the writer hereof, that the current legislative framework 
does not provide solutions to the industrial problems facing the country. At this juncture the 
investigation of broader issues facing the employment relationship, fragmentation of worker 
organisation and underlying social disorders is imperative. The chapters that follow go on to 
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CHAPTER THREE 
INSTITUTIONALISATION OF INDUSTRIAL CONFICT 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION   
‘You (Honourable President) are a broken man, presiding over a broken society.’122 
These are the scathing words of Democratic Alliance (DA) Parliamentary Leader Mmusi 
Maimane during the State of The Nation debate 2015. His response was at its simplest referring 
to a failed state that has become marred with violent, riddled with a dysfunctional labour 
system123 and broken institutions among its other short comings.  A comparison is more often 
than not drawn between the post-apartheid regime and its unfortunate predecessor with some 
holding that the latter was governed better.124 One of the difference between this democratic era 
and the apartheid regime is that the institutions of the latter were not broken but rather built to 
break the nation. With our constitutional democracy still in its infancy, the newly formed 
government moved quickly to institutionalise industrial conflict,125 this in a bid to curb the 
violent strikes that had characterised labour unrest since the early 1980s.126 The system that had 
been ushered through promulgation of the Act was devised to advance labour peace through the 
advancement of ‘orderly collective bargaining’ and effective resolution of disputes.127 There was 
urgency in change that was aimed at addressing the many strikes that left strikers frequently 
beaten at the hands of police brutality, intimidated and sometimes slayed by striking workers.128 
Von Holdt suggests that the thinking behind the strategy of institutionalising industrial conflict 
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was so that disputes would be managed through democratic procedures and institutions which 
would ultimately bring about labour peace; he records the idea in these lines:         
‘The perception had been that political incorporation of workers into a post-apartheid democracy, 
with the full institutionalisation of industrial conflict in a new post-apartheid labour legislation, 
strike violence and high levels of mass militancy which sustained it would decline.’129  
Alas this goal has failed to materialise, instead there has been widespread breakdown and 
disregard of the institutions that aim to deal with industrial conflict.130 In a progressive attempt 
to deal with the fall out of post democratic violence in strikes, the government has thought it is 
best to deal with situation by further limiting the right to strike much to the dismay of trade 
unions and commentators.131 This stance by the government is an indication of its belief in that 
disputes can be best managed through arbitration and institutions of adjudication instead of 
allowing parties to bargain collectively. Simply put, the government wants to intervene as a 
mediator instead of allowing employers and unions to find a working solution on their own.  
The situation on the ground is fragile, one gets the feeling that with every deadlocked negotiation, 
a wildcat strike marred by violence is on the horizon. It is the opinion of a pool of authors that 
the institutionalisation of conflict has failed to live up to what it was designed for.132 In response, 
some have called for a reform in the form of a ‘comprehensive overhaul of labour relations 
law;’133 while others have inked together solutions that require us to look deeper into the 
underlying social orders that remain unsettled.134 The contention advanced here is that for as 
long as the workforce is subjected to structural violence and social inequalities, violence will be 
an inevitable feature of strikes.135 For as long as the relationship between the government, trade 
unions and businesses is broken and there is distrust between role players who are unwilling to 
compromise, the situation will persist. For now it suffice to say that the violence on the picket-
line is really a wake-up call to re-examine our system of dispute resolution, including strike law 
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with a view to eliminate dysfunctional barriers instead of carving out new ones.136 These barriers 
include limiting the right to strike and to bargaining collectively. The submission is that a broken 
society will continue to break for as long as underlying faults continue to cripple it and as long 
as they remain unattended to. It is against this narrative in which this chapter investigates the 
effectiveness of institutionalising industrial conflict.  
The narrative is long, the prelude is quite clear; it holds that there is a problem, everyone agrees 
and the Marikana tragedy is tangible expression of these difficulties. The narrative continues in 
the form of discussions that attempt to understand the underlying conditions which include social 
inequalities137 and lack of union cohesion.138 The government has a chapter in this long play; it 
writes its story through various amendments of the Act of what it considers to be a way forward.  
3.2   INSTITUTIONALISED INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 
Industrial conflict is said to be a dramatic expression of the relationship between employers and 
the workforce.139 The existence of conflict is not troubling as there is acceptance that it is 
inevitable given the fundamentally different objectives between the two parties.140 What is of 
concern is the bloodshed that has characterised a number of recent strikes.141 Institutionalisation 
of industrial conflict was thought to be capable of bringing a solution to the violence that was 
seen at the time it was introduced.142 Four decades have passed since South African adopted the 
strategy of institutionalising industrial conflict.143 The question therefore is whether this strategy 
is effective in managing disputes. On this the jury is still out. Some commentators are of the 
belief that it is effective in managing and minimising a situation which could be much worse in 
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its absence.144 A view on the other side of the table holds that it is not, it concludes by holding 
that for as long as underlying social orders remain unattended to, the situation will persist.145  
Before one can pronounce on the effectiveness of the institutions that have been developed to 
regulate and manage conflict, one needs to first understand what institutionalisation of industrial 
conflict entails. Subsequent to this will be a review of the history of this strategy and whether it 
has achieved what it was designed for. This will be situated within a timeline that consists of pre-
apartheid law, apartheid era law and post-apartheid law.   
3.2.1  Definition 
Institutionalisation of industrial conflict is the management of disputes through the development 
of procedures and structures to regulate and manage same.146 The practice is really a set of forums 
and procedures such as the Labour Court and arbitration institutions which are empowered to 
manage disputes between employers and employees. However where law channels certain 
disputes to these institutions it is effectively limiting the right to strike and to bargain collectively. 
The reason for this is that the right to strike is essential to collective bargaining. It is said that 
‘without the right to strike collective bargaining becomes collective begging’.147 This is because 
the right to strike that is afforded to workers gives trade unions greater bargaining power as 
employers try to avoid a strike from taking place as this often would result in stoppage of work. 
The status quo was however different before the turn of the 1980s as seen from the narrative 
below.  
3.2.2  Before-apartheid 
Laws concerning labour were initially based on “common law, which emphasised freedom of 
contract (the ability of the parties to the employment relationship to regulate their respective 
rights and duties”) within the broad limits of legality and the public policy.148 Under this free-
market system labour was regarded as a product, subject to the laws of supply and demand.149 It 
was believed that there was no basis for the special treatment of employees since it would affect 
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the interplay of market forces.150 Intervention by government was also criticised.151 The courts 
had nothing to offer as employers could legally terminate the contract at will.152 As long as the 
necessary notice was given, courts could not intervene merely because the dismissal was 
unfair.153 This is more or less the same free-market system which according to Martin Brassey 
is the best way of advancing the general welfare of society.154 This system has however received 
much criticism.155 Among the deficiencies cited, is that it is individualistic in character, it affords 
no regard to the collective relationship between employees and employers.156  
The strongest and most significant disapproval of the free-market system came from Karl Marx, 
during the mid-ninth century.157 Marx believed that the continued alienation and exploitation of 
workers would lead to a situation where the working class would arrive at the ‘necessary 
consciousness’ and thereby form the unity needed for social revolution.158 It at this point that “he 
supported the formation of trade unions and the struggle for higher wages and improved working 
conditions”.159 Even at this early stage it was accepted that conflict is inevitable, naturally arising 
from the fundamentally different objectives of employers and employees. Institutionalisation of 
conflict was suggested as a way of resolving conflicting interests.160  
From the narrative above it is clear that employment law was governed according to the law of 
contract and subject to the prevailing boni mores of the community. It was left to the individual 
employee and employer to decide the terms on which they wanted to engage. Contracts that 
contained provision that were contrary to public policy were allowed. In instances where there 
was disputes between an employee and the employer, outside interventions in the form of a third 
party such as an arbitrator could not be sourced. It was believed that influences from adjudication 
and arbitration institutions would be a dramatic intervention which was to be avoided at all cost 
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as this would lead to the disruption of market forces. The reason for this was that the sanctity of 
the freedom of contract was held in high regard. The situations as most authors agree is that there 
was exploitation of the workforce because of unequal bargaining powers, this continued 
mistreatment lead to discussions that paved the way for the incorporation of collective action and 
institutionalisation of industrial conflict.161 In summation, one could say that the free-market 
system left it to the devise of the parties to the employment relationship to deal with their own 
dispute, however this was detrimental to the rights of the workforce as it gave employers the 
right to be arbitrary162 and rightfully so it was dismantled.  
3.2.3 Apartheid regime  
The narrative begins with the 1991 strikes at the Village Deep mines in Kimberly which at the 
time was known as Dutoispan. It is here that the workforces, as Marx had foretold, began to 
appreciate their collective power and went on strike.163 This revolt was however short lived as 
they strikers were violently returned to work by the police with many being incarcerated under 
the Masters and Servants Act.164 A decade later, larger and more violent strikes took place on 
the Witwatersrand as a result of the disparity in the scales of pay between white and black 
miners.165 These labour unrest are well documented under the title of the Rand Rebellion. The 
Rand Rebellion became one of the most violent strike in South African history as it resulted in a 
considerable number of workers being killed and seriously injured.166 In an attempt to control 
the violent outbreak, conciliation machinery in the form of the Industrial Conciliation Act167 
among others were promulgated in 1924.168 The purpose of this piece of legislation was to control 
and prevent industrial conflict, by allowing collective bargaining and conciliation to take place 
in the event of a dispute.169 However this proved to be a contradiction in terms because this Act 
caused further conflict through job reservation for white workers and segregation in terms of 
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race, class and wages of the workforce at the time. 170 For this it received it fair share of 
criticism.171     
It became a forgone conclusion that the Conciliation Act was a platform in which the government 
could control workers.172 This contention stands even though it was for the most part recognised 
as the most comprehensive labour law legislation which afforded many trade unions legal 
status.173 The submission is premised on the fact that under the Conciliation Act, black workers 
were expressly excluded from the definition of employee which meant that the benefits afforded 
by the Conciliation Act were inaccessible to them.174   
Those hoping for a proper institutionalisation of the industrial conflicts were disappointed when 
in the wake of the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, the apartheid regime embarked on a wave of 
subjugation by banning a number of black owned political parties as well as driving the South 
African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) into exile.175 Subsequent to this, South Africa was 
to experience long periods of labour peace but these were mere products of the economic and 
political forces that prevailed at the time as opposed to the working of statutory conciliation 
processes.176 Despite this calmness, the struggles for recognition of unions for black workers 
continued in 1973 when ten thousand workers took to the streets of Durban to demand wage 
increases, in the process breaking the decade-old industrial peace.177 These violent strikes 
culminated in the establishment of the Wiehahn Commission of 1997 which was created to 
investigate the state of industrial relations.178 The Wiehahn Commission concluded that it would 
be better to allow African trade unions to register at an early stage in order to control the pace of 
union development.179 It is submitted that the collective bargaining rights that surfaced were still 
lacking.180 In particular, the right to picket, which was crucial for unions to exert moral pressures 
of the majority against the non-strikers was banned by legislation.181 Furthermore the law did 
not give unions the right to strike since legally striking workers were not protected from 
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dismissal.182 Notwithstanding the new labour legislation, employers were frequently hostile in 
the face of union activity and political repression undoubtedly exacerbated industrial conflict, 
with incidences of non-strikers being targeted escalating after the State of Emergency was 
imposed in 1986.183 The source of continued violence was soon linked with the failings of 
statutory conciliation processes as seen from Shane Godfrey’s accounts.184 
Godfrey makes the submission that the primary dispute-settling forums that were present in the 
apartheid era, namely the conciliation boards, industrial courts and industrial councils had proved 
over time unequal to their tasks.185 The author uses empirical evidence to sustain his claim. 
Drawing his findings from the statistics of the Department of Manpower which showed that the 
success rates of the industrial courts were less than 30 per cent and those of statutory conciliation 
machinery were at a measly 20 per cent.186 This research possess serious question on the 
effectiveness of the institutionalisation of industrial conflict at the time.  
Accounts of labour unrest in the apartheid era are in large numbers with some exhibiting violence 
at a perpetual level.187 To deal with the many disputes that had occurred, the government 
blandished and criminalised industrial action of workers.188 This stance by the government as a 
means to an end did not seem to be effective in dealing with labour unrest, it did not did not deter 
the violence outbreaks seen at the time and especially in the seventies.189 This is because strikers 
were either unaware of the prohibitions that existed or they did not care.190  
The reality is that limitation to the right to strike rarely offsets violence and protracted strikes.191 
On the other hand dispute-settling forums were failing to deal with that which they had been 
purposed for.192 Evident from the discussion is that even though to some extent there was 
institutionalisation of industrial conflict it could not be said that it was effective in managing 
disputes that often became violent. The submission is that a lack of political enfranchisement, 
the failings of dispute-settling forums and the limitation on trade union power lead to many 
                                                          
182 Ibid.   
183 Ibid; M Brassey (note 152 above) 8. 
184 S Godfrey ‘Labour relations law in context’ in Du Toit (ed) Labour Relations Law 3 ed (2000) 24. 
185 Ibid.   
186 Ibid. 
187 E Webster ‘The promise and the possibility: South Africa’s contested industrial relations path’ (2013) 81(1) 
Transformation: Critical Perspective on Southern Africa; The 1913 Mineworkers’ Strike (note 37 above). 
188  Brassey (note 152 above) 7. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid, 8.  
191 Rycroft (note 2 above) 2. 
192 Godfrey (note 184) 24.  
25 | P a g e  
 
violent and protracted protests. The idea was that in post-apartheid the situation would change 
given the fact that surely the government would make way for the development of strong trade 
unions and the newly formed rights of the nation to determine its own affairs under the 
Constitution of 1996193 would settle the conundrum of violent disputes. This however has not 
occurred as seen in the narrative that follows. 
3.2.4 Post-Apartheid 
After the elections of 1994, a spirit of industrial democracy had to be crafted; labour peace and 
production had to be encouraged.194 With this in mind the Act was drafted. The Act is designed 
to facilitate the advancement of economic development, social justice and labour peace all of 
which are to be achieved through the promotion of ‘orderly collective bargaining and ‘effective 
resolution of labour disputes’.195 What is clear from this is that the newly formed government 
had prioritised industrial conflict with the aim of bringing an end to the wave of industrial actions 
that was witnessed in the late 1970s.196 The strategy advanced entailed the institutionalisation of 
industrial conflict through strengthening the powers of the institutions designed to facilitate 
among others, orderly collective bargaining and effective resolution of disputes.197 In post-
apartheid South Africa a number of new forms of third party interventions were created by 
legislature to entertain industrial conflict.198 Of these, the most important are bargaining councils, 
the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), and the Labour Court. 
However due to the number of violent strikes that have surfaced, the effectiveness of these 
institutions in dealing with industrial conflict has come under scrutiny. 
One of the violent strikes that have brought about the debate on the effectiveness of 
institutionalised industrial conflict is the well documented Lonmin Marikana strike of 2012.199 
This strike like many others in recent time was marred with assault and intimidation all of which 
culminated into the massacre of 34 strikers by the South African Police.200 A lack of union 
cohesion is cited as the catalyst to the strike becoming protracted and engulfed with high levels 
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of tension.201 It is observed that leading to the massacre was fierce competition for bargaining 
rights between the NUM and AMCU.202 The reality is that there was already a two-year 
collective agreement in place which NUM (the majority trade union), had entered into with the 
management of the Lonmin Platinum mine.203 Notwithstanding the subsisting collective 
agreement, 3000 workers disregarded collective bargaining procedures set out in the Act and 
embarked on a strike in an attempt to force negotiations with management.204 Venter, through 
empirical evidence, argues that what is evident from the strike is the current trend of “workers 
to disregard requirements of labour legislation and to breach existing collective agreements [that 
have been] duly executed by elected union officials by embarking on wildcat strike actions, in 
the process employing violence [and] intimidation in order to force [employees] to accede to 
their demands.205 This [he concludes ‘poses] “grave danger for peaceful and harmonious 
industrial relations practice in” South Africa’.206 This trend is apparent in a number of strikes 
before and after Marikana of these the 2012 Farm Workers Strike207 and the 2014 Platinum 
Strike208 
Towards the end of the 2012, farm workers in the in the Boland farming town of De Doorns went 
on strike over low pay and poor working conditions. This strike was illegal as it was organised 
by workers outside the trade union structure.209 Violence, arson, intimidation and killings 
characterised this strike from beginning to end.210 The events led to the death of three workers, 
R150 million in damages as well as a 53 per cent increase in the official minimum wage.211 What 
is of significance about this strike is that the ordinary dispute resolution procedures were 
abandoned to an extent that the agreement between the farm managers, Congress of South 
African Trade Union (COSATU) and government was defied.212 This then leads one to agree 
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with the submission of Martin Brassey when he argues that institutionalised collective bargaining 
in South Africa is wilting.213   
It is clear that many have decided to disregard the dispute resolution procedures that are detailed 
in the Act. Strikes that are in contempt of the Act and court orders as well as being violent have 
become a norm.214 This suggests that labour unions are fast losing confidence of their members 
and workers are no longer willing to trust unions to negotiate on their behalf. The reality is that 
striking workers are taking matters into their own hands this is a result of a combination of 
division among unions and structural inequality. Chapter five looks at how these issues can be 
addressed. 
3.3 CONLCUSION 
At the onset this chapter set out to investigate the effectiveness of institutionalisation of industrial 
conflict. It sought to pronounce on whether the institutions that are designated to deal with labour 
dispute are successful. The narrative above leads one to the following unequivocal conclusion, 
this being the fact “that several factors continue to undermine the institutionalisation of healthy 
industrial relations.”215 Among these factors is the disregard for dispute resolutions procedures 
by striking workers216 and underlying social disorders such as structural inequalities.217 These 
factors have resulted in collective violence by the workers as seen in a number of recent strikes. 
Research shows that there is a trend that is being employed by strikers to continuously disregard 
labour law dispute resolution procedures.218 The reality is that, whether the law prescribes that 
workers cannot go on strike over certain issues, workers will continue to go on strike 
nevertheless. This trend however is not new, it was evident in the late 1970s where workers went 
on strike even though these were illegal.219 Four decades later the government has through the 
limitation of the right to strike thought it best to limit the right to strike over added issues  such 
as unfair discrimination.220  
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The submission is that like in the 1970s, and in recent times, strikers will not be deterred by laws 
that prohibit them from going on strike. It safe to conclude that forcing workers into set 
procedures and structures of resolving conflict has failed since there is a trend to disregard 
dispute resolution procedures by going on strike even though the right over that particular issue 
is limited, this will continue to happen for as long as underlying conditions are unsettled.  The 
idea is to now look at the underlying conditions such as a lack of cohesion between the 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REFORMING LABOUR RELATIONS LAW ACCORDING TO THE 
IDEALS OF SOCIAL CORPORATISM 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
The conundrum that is industrial conflict has been alive for as long as the workplace has 
existed.221 Given the diverging interests and objectives of employers and employees, conflict 
becomes inherent.222 Notwithstanding this, it cannot be accepted that there is violence on a 
perpetual scale that is being witnessed on the picket-line. The current position threatens the 
maintenance of harmonious labour relations and the economic stability of the country.223 In 
response to the wave of industrial action currently facing the country, Martin Brassey has called 
for a complete reform in the labour system in the form of a ‘comprehensive overhaul of labour 
relations law’.224 The discussion that follows calls for a theoretical reframing of attitude towards 
the labour relations system that is currently operating in South Africa as a vehicle in which to 
mobilise unity, deliver labour peace and inspire economic stability.  
The discussion in the previous chapters has established that the government has chosen to 
respond to increasing violence during strikes by limiting the right to strike and thereby diverting 
disputes into institutions that allow for third party interventions in the form of judges and 
commissioners of bargaining councils. The current system is premised on achieving labour peace 
through the channelling of disputes into arbitration and adjudicative institutions which are 
mediated by judges or commissioners of bargaining councils, this in turn weakens collective 
rights as it limits the right to strike which is seen as an important tool in collective bargaining.225 
The submission advanced in this chapter holds that this approach is largely pluralistic226 in 
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character.227 According to this approach, industrial peace can be best achieved through the 
balancing of power between unions and employers in isolation from environmental factors such 
as prevailing socio-economics conditions.228 
However, recent violence on the picket line outlines a failure to manage industrial conflict; in 
light of this, emphasis on set procedures and institutions alone cannot be the answer.229 The 
argument avers that in order to deal with violence on the picket line, collective bargaining must 
work in partnership with broad political transformation.230 Webster and Simpson call this the 
‘constitutionalisation of the working class’.231 Employers and employee representatives must be 
engaged continuously in an effort to improve the lives of the working class outside the shop 
floor. In South Africa this has not happened in its totality.232 The argument holds that the creation 
of harmonious industrial relations depends on other, non-legal means. When different role 
players are attempting to manage conflict they must be considerate of the broader socio-
economic conditions of society.233 Furthermore, the socio-economic needs of society must be 
considered and attended to even when there is no conflict. This also calls for pre-emptive 
collective bargaining, which calls for the representatives of trade unions and employers to 
introduce detailed action plans on negotiation strategies, which will include discussions on 
anticipated issues over which a strike might take place.234 When this is done social corporatism 
(also called social democratic corporatism)235 becomes the system that is adopted. The arguments 
advanced hold that we are to adopt social corporatism as a substitute for pluralism, for reasons 
detailed below.236   
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Social corporatism understands that the continued working of labour relations and industrial 
peace depends on larger welfare provisions that work in a lock and key combination with pre-
emptive collective bargaining.237 As things stand, in South Africa these two features work in 
isolation. The social corporatism perspective further understand the place of employers, trade 
unions and the state as going beyond the bounds of the labour market.238 Employers and 
employees share a common interest in maintaining a more equal society.239 The effect of this 
stance is that the management of industrial conflict is confronted holistically240 and is not side-
lined as merely issues of supply and demand; instead violence in industrial conflict is seen as the 
manifestation of a breaking society in the form of structural violence and social inequalities.241 
Pre-emptive collective bargaining and the strengthening of the relationship between the 
government, trade unions and businesses are approaches which will be key to the fixing of our 
disintegrating industrial system that continues to be charged with unrest and entrenched social 
inequalities.242 Violence on the picket-line cannot be solved by the introduction of striker 
controls that merely force disputes into arbitration institutions instead of allowing for 
constructive engagement and collective bargaining on these.243 Arguably, s 65(1)(c) of the Act 
does not speak to the broader issues relevant to the industrial relationship.244 Perpetual increase 
in violence is instead a call to re-examine our system of dispute resolution with a view of 
eliminating stricter controls on strikes rather than introducing new ones.245 
The discussion that follows aims to put into perspective the importance of moving from pluralism 
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4.2 PLURALISM AS AN APPROACH TO INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 
The labour relations framework that is currently operating in South Africa has characteristics of 
past apartheid structures that are based on adversarial and pluralist relationships.246 It was hoped 
that the political transformation of 1994 would be a catalyst for a move into a social corporatism 
of industrial labour system.247 Propositions advanced in this dissertation argue that this has not 
happened. For one, the relationship between the unions, businesses and the government which 
forms the basis of social corporatism is faulty and adversarial.248 The argument advanced here 
therefore holds that one major part of social corporatism is still lacking. There is a need for those 
in the employment relationship and the government to reach agreements on labour law provision 
that not only satisfy the immediate needs of their own but also take into account the broader 
society and its needs.249 Our labour relations system has failed to transform into social 
corporatism instead it is still pluralistic and adversarial with remnants of social corporatism here 
and there. Remnants of social corporatism in South Africa include the existence of a socio-
political organisation of society by major interest groups such as the government, trade unions 
and employers. The discussion that follows details the faults in our current labour relations 
framework. Preceding this is an analysis of what pluralism entails. 
Pluralism in broad terms accepts that society consist of competing interests groups and it extends 
to each of these the right to free association and to further the interests of their constituents by 
negotiation.250 Conflict is therefore expected but it is believed that it should be pre-empted as it 
is destructive to the economy.251 Pluralism is therefore concerned with the idea of how we are to 
distribute power around role players.252 In the labour relations framework it aims to bring labour 
peace and stability in the economy through the balancing of power between unions and 
employers.253 Conflict is to be managed through (institutionalisation) structures and procedures. 
What this means is that arbitration and adjudicative procedures are at the forefront to the 
management of industrial conflict. One such example would be to limit the right to strike by 
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forcing workers to use set structures and procedures which involve third party intervention to 
resolve a dispute instead collective bargaining.254 
4.3 SOUTH AFRICA’S CURRENT LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
South Africa’s difficult labour history started with a decade of increasing labour unrest and 
inadequate statutory provisions all of which resulted in the revolt by white mineworkers on the 
Rand in 1922.255 In response the government introduced the Industrial Conciliation Act of 
1924256 which was the first labour legislation that structured relationships between employers 
and unions in South Africa. This Act was modelled on the pluralist principles of resolving dispute 
through institutions that are provided by the government. Three decades later a more 
comprehensive piece of legislation was promulgated in the form of the Labour Relations Act of 
1956.257 The 1956 Act sought to promote collective bargaining and eliminate unfair labour 
practices through the development of forums such as industrial councils. These councils had the 
power to conclude collective agreements that are binding on all parties and in certain instances 
non-parties.258 In terms of the 1956 Act, disputes were largely settled either by agreement, 
assisted by voluntary mediation or by third-party intervention in the form of arbitration or 
adjudication or as a last resort by industrial action.259 
Despite the efforts of the 1956 Act, in the seventies there was a considerable increase in the 
number of strikes, all of which were illegal but they happened just the same.260 The Labour 
Relations Act of 1995 was then introduced. The Act is purposed on the advancement of labour 
peace and collective bargaining by enhancing the powers of the forums designed to facilitate 
those objectives.261 In keeping with the pluralist ideology, the Act much like its predecessor 
accepts that conflict is natural and functional but believes that it must be managed through set 
structures and procedures.262 The argument is that the country has not escaped the pluralist 
relationship of the apartheid regime is supported by the fact that the Amendment Act show that 
the government still believes that the best way to deal with conflict is in the form of diverting 
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anticipated conflict on an extended array of issues falling within employment law into arbitration 
and adjudication.263 
4.3.1 Remnants of Social Corporatism  
It is accepted that social corporatism is founded on a tripartite relationship that consists of the 
government, trade unions and businesses.264 It follows then that for social corporatism to function 
there must be a strong and working tripartite relationship.265 The arguments advanced here 
suggest that even though it was thought that after 1994 there would be a move away from the 
adversarial and pluralistic relationship that characterised the apartheid regime into a spirit of 
political transformation,266 this has not happened. Rycroft considers one such blatant example of 
failed relationships between the government and social parties which became apparent in the 
process leading to the adoption of the Amendment Act, in part signalling a lack of political 
transformation and cohesion among the government, trade unions and businesses.267   
Soon after the country had ushered in a new political dispensation there was a deep need for 
social parties and the government to work collectively to ensure that a fallout is avoided as it 
would have fuelled an already tense transition, in this manner the relationship between, the state, 
trade unions and businesses became strong and constructive. In the 1990s, a healthy tripartite 
relationship was apparent from the collective compromise of social parties and the government 
in the adoption of labour legislation.268 The Act was drafted and approved by the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) and subsequently signed into the law 
with minimal changes.269 This position showed a healthy relationship of tri-partisan cooperation 
built on trust and most importantly compromise.270 Alas nearly two decades later the situation 
changed considerably as evident from  the development of the Labour Relations Amendment 
Bill of 2012 all the way to the enactment of the Amendment Act. This submission is premised 
on the fact that Parliament deleted and amended a number of the provisions that were agreed at 
NEDLAC.271   
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NEDLAC is an essential feature of the tripartite relationship as it is an institution in which 
representative and collaborative consideration of ‘all proposed labour legislation relation to 
labour market policy’ must take place ‘before being introduced to Parliament’.272 NEDLAC is a 
state funded body comprising of state representatives, union representatives, members who 
represent organisation of community and development interests, organised labour 
representatives and those who representing organised business.273 Constructive engagement on 
labour issues such as increasing violence during strikes should be addressed at NEDLAC on their 
way to subsequent approval with necessary but minimal changes from Parliament. The argument 
holds that the governing party should not usurp the work done at NEDLAC by using it majority 
powers in Parliament to make significant changes to the agreements concluded at NEDLAC.  
Given the representatively and importance of this institution it would have been thought that a 
discussion on the Amendment Act would have gone along the same line from Bill to Act as did 
the 1995 Act. This however did not happen. Instead there were substantial amendments and 
deletion by Parliament of several important sections that were agreed at NEDLAC.274 It was the 
view of the ANC lead government that ‘Parliament has the right to consider and deliberate on 
the recommendations and legislate.'275  
One cannot help but concur with Rycroft in holding that the ability of Parliament to unilaterally 
overrule the outcome of the negotiations and deliberations of NEDLAC pushes it to a position 
of growing irrelevance.276 The situation then leads one to think that whiles South Africa purports 
to be a country built on a strong tripartite relationship, the reality is that the relationship is 
fragmented, this largely as a result of a government that continues to usurp collective work 
through its majority power. The reality is that we are a pluralist state under the guise of a socio-
political state consisting of the government, employers and trade unions.   
4.3.2 Marikana Massacre: A case in point  
The tragic events of the Marikana massacre are set out in detail in the previous chapter. The 
discussion that follows uses the Marikana strike to contextualise the argument of the current 
legislative framework being pluralistic in character.  The discussion aims to show that the tragedy 
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that occurred in the Platinum Hills of Marikana can be explained by the disregard of the 
structures and procedures put in place to manage conflict, this failure is also linked to ‘social 
distance’.277 Social distance in this context refers to the position in which those in power become 
more concerned with staying in power as opposed to the challenges of those they are 
representing.278 Chinguno explains the current situation of violent and protracted strikes as one 
stemming from social distance.279 This continued adversarial relationship between the state, trade 
unions and employers threatens harmonious industrial relations, contributes to structural 
violence and ultimately leads workers to become quick-tempered as they start to feel the effects 
of social distance.280 The discussion will show that the failed tripartite relationship has left 
workers with no choice but to use strikes as means of protest which are in turn ‘fuelled by a rage 
against continuing poverty and unmet expectation after years of liberation from apartheid’.281 
The unilateral usurping of power by the government on collective work by social structures, like 
NEDLAC, also undermines labour peace. A look into the events of Marikana now follows to 
explain these arguments. 
 The first propellant to the flames that engulfed the Marikana tragedy came in the form of a 
refusal by Lonmin management to engage or recognises representatives put in place by the 
striking workers.282 Labelling these workers as arrogant exploiters only worked in fuelling an 
already volatile situation.283 The stance of Lonmin management of not being open to negotiations 
by sticking to the collective agreement in place affirms the position of employers in believing 
that conflict should be institutionalised. Instead of insisting compliance with the collective 
agreement that was in place which prohibited a strike at the time, management should have been 
open to hearing the concerns of its employees, at the very least. The Farmlam Commission report 
concludes that bloodshed would have been avoided if the mines had been closed.284 However the 
immediate needs of Lonmin to make profit over the safely of it workers played into a pluralistic 
objective. A total of 44 people had to first lose their lives before the state and social parties could 
                                                          
277 C Chinguno ‘Unpacking the Marikana massacre’ (2013) 124 Global Labour Column2, available at 
http:column.global-labour-university.org, accessed 2 January 2016.   
278 Ibid.  
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid.  
281 Schutte & Sandile (note 1 above) 74.  
282 Samuel (note 45 above) 249.  
283 Ibid.  
284 Farlam (note 26 above) 471. 
37 | P a g e  
 
agree to re-open negotiations through the CCMA, a procedure which was a clear departure from 
conflict management procedures of the Act.285  
Swelling tension between NUM and workers contributed immensely to the strike.286 Striking 
workers felt that NUM had failed to advance their interest during the wage negotiations with 
Lonmin management.287 Their dissatisfaction went from rejecting representation from NUM to 
an attempted attack on its officials on 14 August 2012.288  
Government has also not escaped scathing criticism for it approach to the dispute. The brutal 
force employed by the police was condemned in the strongest manner.289 For his part Deputy 
President and non-executive director and shareholder at Lominin, Cyril Ramaphosa saw blame 
being imputed on him by the representative of the victims.290 It was contended that his call for 
‘concomitant action’ in the days leading to the Marikana tragedy was a catalyst for the hostile 
stance taken by police on the morning of the tragedy.291 The government is working towards 
dousing any resistance against it by introducing stricter controls on strikes, there is also 
adversarial competition among the different unions and the employers are on a mission of making 
as much profit as possible while the country is profitable. This is not consistent with social 
corporatism.292  
4.4 TOWARDS SOCIAL CORPORATISM  
Two years into the new millennium, Finnemore predicted the trajectory of South Africa’s labour 
relations system.293 In his discourse he entertains the idea that in light of the country’s ‘unique 
state of political and economic transformation’, two possible outcomes exist.294 The first 
prediction holds that it is possible that the country might adopt social corporatism which may 
influence effective social dialogue and decision-making.295 On the other hand the author believes 
that the economic factors such as the need to attract investment and attend to growing 
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unemployment crisis could lead the government into controlling trade unions strictly.296 The 
second of these predictions has since come true, the second prediction was that limiting the right 
to strike effectively reduces the ability of trade unions to bargain collectively.297 The proposition 
is that limiting the right to strike is erroneous. Research shows that there is a trend by strikers to 
continuously disregard labour law dispute resolution procedures which in some instances 
prohibit the right to strike.298 This trend existed in the 1970s and it evident in the current political 
dispensation, therefore there is a need to move away from institutionalisation of conflict as our 
main resolution to dispute. A new approach needs to be adopted, this approach is social 
corporatism.  
It is understood that social corporatism is perceived to provide less strike-prone society, Sweden 
being one such example.299 The discussion will advance two proposition as to why this 
contention is true. The first proposition holds that one essential feature of social corporatism is 
still missing, this being compromise.300 In this tripartite relationship that exists, the government 
is the only one that is not willing to forego anything.301 This situation is in stark contrast to the 
unfolding of events of the early 1990s. In September of 1990 there was constructive and swift 
accord between COSATU, National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), the Department of e 
Department of Manpower and other interested parties on the 1991 Labour Relations Amendment 
Act.302 A decade later the situation has changed, the government is no longer willing to 
compromise on labour provisions that do not satisfy their immediate needs. A tangible example 
of this is the government’s total disregard of provisions of the Amendment Act that were agreed 
to at NEDLAC.303 The question however still remains as to why there is increasing violence on 
the picket line.  
The answer to this question is short yet profound, the reality is that workers have lost trust in, 
trade unions and employers.304 Workers believe that it is only they who can force change and 
there protests we see are effectively fuelled by rage against continuing poverty and unmet 
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expectation that have persisted notwistanding two decades of democracy.305 Workers in 
Marikana attacked their representative, government refused to classify the events as a protest 
instead calling it criminal acts and employers labelled those on strikes as arrogant exploiters.306 
Social corporatism aims to bring back parity by forcing all parties into some form of 
compromising and calling the state and interested parties to work together to reach agreements 
that satisfy the needs of the broader society.307  
4.5 CONCLUSION 
Failed corporation and compromise between trade unions, businesses and especially by the 
government is a major part of the problem that contributes to violent strikes. The argument here 
holds that all the members of this relationship are ineffective in attending to the broader economic 
and social issues of the workers. Social corporatism calls on the tripartite members to work 
progressively towards this. Simply put, parties in social corporatism aim to reach agreements 
that satisfy the broader needs of society as opposed to the immediate need of their. This however 
has not happened; the Marikana Massacre is a case in point.  
Lastly, in order to restore labour peace we need move away from adversarial and pluralistic 
industrial relationships and into a spirit of social corporatism. In order for this to be happen it is 
proposed that the government should not use its majority power to usurp the collective work of 
social parties. As explained in the discussion above, the government is using it majority power 
in parliament to make substantial amendments to provisions that were agreed at NEDLAC, this 
has to change as representatives from business and employees are starting to feel as if they are 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS 
A number of problems in the current labour relations framework have been made apparent from 
the discussion on the previous chapters. Among these; trade union division;309 disregard of 
dispute resolution procedures;310 entrenched social inequalities;311 the growing irrelevance of 
NEDLAC312 and the lack of cohesion between the government; trade unions and employers.313 
Consequently there is a need for a holistic response to the problems at hand.314 The government 
must approach the situation with a view of eliminating the violence that is employed during 
strikes, this being first priority. Through the solutions suggested in this chapter, it is also possible 
to reduce the number of strikes and thereby bring much needed economic stability and 
harmonious labour relations. However it is worth mentioning that the responsibility of 
encouraging labour peace does not rest solely with the government. There is a need for trade 
unions, businesses and the government to work collectively in ensuring that there is no further 
loss of life and damage to property on the picket-line.  
5.1.1 Building a strong tripartite relationship 
There is a resounding agreement between authors on the limitation of the right to strike having 
no effect on the wave of industrial action facing the country.315  The findings are, that unless the 
faults in the industrial relationship are attended to then there will continue to be violent strikes.316 
The idea is to look at fixing the broader issues affecting this relationship. There is an urgent need 
for trade unions and employers to reach agreements that aim to satisfy the broader needs of 
society instead of looking to only fulfil their own immediate needs.317  
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The greatest responsibility rests with the government. There is an urgent need for it not to use it 
majority power in parliament to usurp the collective work of social parties. A failure to do this 
will lead trade unions and employers to feel undermined thereby disconnecting themselves from 
the social inequality that continues to plague the working class, this has already started to occure 
as seen from Lonmin management and NUMs unwillingness to re-open negotiation.318 If we are 
to achieve labour peace, the government has to compromise and yield when necessary to the 
provisions agreed at NEDLAC. In turn this will create a strong relationship that is built on trust 
and compromise between government, trade unions and employers. This in turn will lead to 
workers regaining trust in their unions and the government. Ultimately striking workers will not 
resort to violence in an attempt to force the hands of the employer because they will be under the 
belief that the unions and employers are working collectively for their interests instead of 
collaborating on self-serving interests.319 
5.1.2 Pre-emptive collective bargaining 
Having established that the best solution to industrial conflict is to allow for engagement between 
social parties and the government, it is now important to consider how to make these discussions 
constructive. One suggestion advanced here is that there should be pre-emptive collective 
bargaining even in instances where there is no dispute. In order to fulfil these commitments the 
union and employer negotiation teams will have to gather around the bargaining table with the 
aid an independent and trusted facilitator. The role of the facilitator apart from the obvious will 
be to bring trust and to improve communication between the parties. The biggest hurdle that this 
study has identified is in the lack of trust and communication between employers, employees 
and their representatives. The idea of pre-emptive collective bargaining will ensure that there is 
adequate communication between all parties involved, this in turn will instil trust. Once more, 
employers and unions will be kept abreast with the difficulties that continue to face the working 
class thus feeding into social corporatism. Explained differently, pre-emptive collective 
bargaining will call for the representatives of trade unions and employers to introduce detailed 
action plans on negotiation strategies, which will include discussions on anticipated issues over 
which a strike might take place.320 A proper explanation of this is provided by Finnemore, who 
describes social corporatism as a strategy that promotes effective social dialogue and decision 
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making on issues that affect the working class.321 Through these various discussion there will be 
discussions on issues that affect employers and will help in keeping those in the employment 
relationship abreast with these difficulties, forcing them to try to find solutions so as to avoid a 
strike.322 
5.1.3 A new look: Amendment Act 
The imposition of stricter controls on strike law is a misguided approach.323 A knee-jerk reaction 
from the government that aims to deal with the fall out of violent strikes by prohibiting the right 
to strike over issues that can be referred to arbitration or the Labour Court in terms of 
employment law. This approach has the same characteristics as those employed by the apartheid 
regime in trying to deal with violent on the picket line. Striking workers will soon realise that 
this approach is no different from those employed by a government that oppressed them a little 
over two decades ago. This will only anger the working class who will start to feel disconnected 
from those who represent them.324  
To reverse this effect there needs to be fresh discussions between the government and social 
parties. First and foremost the 2014 amendments to s 65(1)(c) need to be removed. The study 
has showed that limiting the right to strike is not a proper approach as striking workers in any 
event will disregard dispute resolution procedures that have been put in place. In this regard the 
submission is that there should be research on how to improve the problems identified in this 
study, this is to be followed by discussions at NEDLAC on provisions that will not look to limit 
the right to strike but rather aim to address division among trade unions and create cohesion 
between the government and businesses and trade union need to be focused on. There is an 
immediate need of addressing social inequalities this can either be in the form of amendments to 
the Act which will impose continued obligation on those in the employment relationship to work 
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5.2 CONCLUSION 
The reality that exists is that there are frightening levels of labour unrest. More concerning than 
this is the increasing violence that characterises a number of these recent strikes. To be more 
descriptive, there is damage to property, intimidation of non-striking workers, constant feud 
between the police and strikers and distrust between social parties, the government and labour. 
There is a growing trend that is being employed by striking workers of disregarding dispute 
resolution procedures of the Act, whiles employing violence to push for their demands. In 
response there is now a trend in which employers are acceding to the demands of the workers in 
an effort to end destruction to property as opposed to responding to the dispute at hand. Both 
these trends pose serious threats to harmonious industrial relations and to the economic stability 
of the country. The government has heeded the call and as a result it has made attempts to respond 
to these concerns, this in the form of the Amendment Act.  
As outlined earlier in the discussion, the Amendment Act further increases the number of issues 
that workers cannot go to strike over. This, the discussion accepts is an approach that is 
misguided.325  The strategy here is to limit the right to strike by diverting conflict into set 
procedures and structures of arbitration and adjudication. The argument advanced in this 
discourse is that, much like in the seventies the working class will continue to disregard the laws 
that preclude them from going on strike. In response, the findings of this research makes two 
propositions. 
The first being the need of breaking down pluralistic and adversarial industrial relationships.  In 
order to achieve this social parties and the government need to work collectively in addressing 
not just their immediate political and economic needs but also be mindful of the broader needs 
of society. In doing so they need to adopt social corporatism which as outlined earlier is based 
on social partnership between businesses, trade unions and government. The continued and 
concerted effort between these parties will ensure that all parties gain the trust of the working 
class in turn they will see that these parties are working towards improving the social inequality 
they are faced with, workers will then in response find other means other than violence to resolve 
dispute. This submission is premised on the fact that in a number of strikes identified in this 
study, striking workers employed violence to force the employers hand because they believed 
that their union representatives were colluding with the employers and that the government sees 
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them as nothing but criminals. The second proposition finds that we are to eliminate stricter 
controls on the right to strike as these have no influence on attempts to curb violent strikes  
At the last the words of Darcy Du Toit and Roger Ronnie help summarise the study, they also 
help provide a response to the main research question.326 However the study then goes one step 
further by proposing solutions to the problem of violent strikes. Indeed the government through 
limiting the right to strike is aiming to circumvent another Marikana massacre. However, 
‘violence on the picket-line is a wake-up call not simply to introduce stricter controls, but 
to re-examine our system of dispute resolution, including strike law, more generally with 
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